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Regulation is written with the intent of 
protecting the vulnerable.  However, it can 
cause an undesirable result if written 
without understanding how the positive 
intent can have a negative impact.  In its 
present form, the proposed Volcker Rule 
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into the capital markets.  Risk will be 
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Banks conducting business in the U.S. or 
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INTENDED AND UNINTENDED RESULTS OF THE PROPOSED VOLCKER RULE 
 
ABSTRACT 
Regulation is written with the intent of protecting the vulnerable.  However, it can cause an undesirable 
result if written without understanding how the positive intent can have a negative impact.  In its 
present form, the proposed Volcker Rule has the potential of expanding the liquidity crisis that 
devastated the housing market into the capital markets.  Risk will be transferred to less regulated 
entities.  Banks conducting business in the U.S. or with U.S. “residents” will be at a competitive 
disadvantage.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
The unintended results of the rule are what can either partially or completely derail the intended results 
of the Volcker Rule.  In the first section, the prohibited practice of proprietary trading and the allowed 
practice of market making will be discussed.  The proposed rule will have the effect of decreasing 
revenue while simultaneously increasing costs for compliance.  The capacity to compete in the global 
markets for covered banking entities as well as for U.S. businesses will also decline. 
Relationships with hedge funds and private equity funds are discussed in the second section.  Risk is 
transferring from the more regulated banking entities to the less regulated asset managers and 
insurance companies.  The transfer will place many, including vulnerable retirees at increased risk.  
Pension funds are underfunded and are investing in hedge funds for absolute returns. 
 
IMPACT ON PROPRIETARY TRADING AND MARKET MAKING 
Market making activity is vital to market efficiency.  If banks are not assured their market making activity 
will be perceived as legal under the Volcker Rule, the opposite effect of the rule’s purpose will occur.  
Liquidity will leave the markets and costs to investors will rise. 
In his video produced by Kantola (2008), Jay Conger quoted a person he identified as a private banking 
executive for a large Swiss bank.  The executive positioned the division’s attitude to competition with 
the statement, “You are about to lose every second customer.”  His words how essential it is to compete 
to gain every new client that has an interest in investment and private banking, and to maintain a secure 
relationship with every one of the division’s established clients. 
In response to the Volcker Rule, Private banking divisions may consider that statement to be more than 
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a positioning of attitude.  It may become reality, especially regarding their high net worth clients that 
provide a large percentage of a bank’s private investment capital.  Rather than invest their wealth with 
private banking, they may move it to a private hedge fund or they may open a family office.  Families 
with $100 million or more have been increasingly trending toward opening independent offices.  The 
first family office was opened by John D. Rockefeller in 1882 to manage his family’s assets.  With the 
advent of the Volcker Rule, a lesser known method for managing wealth is becoming more widely 
implemented. 
The proposed Volcker Rule is 298 pages long.  A complete copy of the draft of the rule released by the 
Federal Reserve can be located online.  The rule’s official name is “Prohibitions And Restrictions On 
Proprietary Trading And Certain Interests In, And Relationships With, Hedge Funds And Private Equity 
Funds” (Federal Reserve, 2011).  It has been named the Volcker Rule after the former Federal Reserve 
Chairman, Paul Volcker (Mehta, 2011).   
A debate is forming in the public sector regarding the unintended results of the rule.  The draft released 
on October 11, 2011 is open for public comment on the Federal Reserve’s web site until January 13, 
2012 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2011).  Whether or not the regulation is 
finalized, the statutory Volcker Rule prohibitions will go into effect on July 21, 2012 (Davis Polk & 
Wardwell LLP, 2011). 
The Volcker Rule draft that was released on October 11, 2011 has two main prohibitions.  First, the rule 
“prohibits [federally] insured depository institutions, bank holding companies, and their subsidiaries or 
affiliates (banking entities)from engaging in short-term proprietary trading of any security, derivative, 
and certain other financial instruments for a banking entity’s own account, subject to certain 
exemptions.  Second, it prohibits owning, sponsoring, or having certain relationships with, a hedge fund 
or private equity fund, subject to certain exemptions.” (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, 2011). 
The first purpose of the proposed Volcker Rule is to protect the customers from losing their deposits 
through trading that involves risk for the firm’s own benefit.  This type of trading is known as proprietary 
trading.  The second purpose is to lessen systemic risk within the financial system.  The intended results 
of the proposed rule follow Newton’s well-known third law, “For every action there is an equal and 
opposite reaction.”  Integrated into the rule, without specific comment, are the unintended results of 
decreasing revenue while simultaneously increasing costs.   
Decreased Revenues 
An unintended result is a large calculation on the revenue side of the equation.  The loss in annual 
revenues by covered financial institutions will be substantial.  Patterson and Zibel (2011) quote analyst 
estimates of $2 billion in lost revenue.  The removal of the source of revenue is occurring at a time when 
banks are already under pressure from substantial costs and weak growth.   
Frank Keating, president and chief executive of the American Bankers Association (ABA) is quoted in the 
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following statement; “Only in today's regulatory climate could such a simple idea become so complex, 
generating a rule whose preamble alone is 215 pages, with 381 footnotes to boot.  How can banks 
comply with a rule that complicated, and how can regulators effectively administer it in a way that 
doesn't make it harder for banks to serve their customers and further weaken the broader economy?" 
Touryalai (2011, Oct 7) provides partial details of revenues at risk.  Goldman Sachs’ has 48 percent 
principal trading revenue at risk, although the Nomura analyst Glenn Schorr is quoted as saying the rule 
will impact 20 percent, which is still a substantial loss of revenue.  Morgan Stanley will also feel the 
effect of the rule with up to 27 percent of its principal trading revenue at risk.   Bank of America has 9 
percent at risk, JPMorgan Chase has 8 percent at risk, and Citigroup has 5 percent at risk.   
Nomura’s analyst, Schorr sounds the alarm when he provides clarity to unintended results of the rule in 
his following statement, “A draconian form of the Volcker Rule will likely have unintended consequences, such 
as reduced liquidity, higher funding costs for U.S. companies, less credit for small businesses, higher trading costs 
and lower investor returns, less ability to transfer risk, and competitive disadvantages for U.S. banks relative to 
foreign banks. We are hopeful regulators are mindful of these risks and doing their best to write fair, yet effective, 
rules.” (Touryalai, 2011 October 7). 
Increased Costs 
As has been discussed, the proposed rule will decrease revenue.  At the same time it will increase costs, 
pushing the revenue and cost equation further out of balance during a weak economy.   
Tourlyalai (2011, Oct 12) quotes Frank Keating, president of The American Banker Association (ABA): 
“Only in today’s regulatory climate could such a simple idea become so complex, generating 
a rule whose preamble alone is 215 pages, with 381 footnotes to boot. How can banks 
comply with a rule that complicated, and how can regulators effectively administer it in a 
way that doesn’t make it harder for banks to serve their customers and further weaken the 
broader economy? 
It’s clear from the proposal that many important details remain unresolved. More questions 
are asked than answered, with requests for public comment on 394 specific issues. The 
exceedingly high number of unanswered questions betrays the frustration regulators are 
having as they come to grips with the complexity of the concepts behind the Volcker Rule 
when applied to reality. Regulators will be working on these practical questions for a long 
time to come…Regulators’ own estimates indicate banks will have to spend nearly 6.6 million 
hours to implement the rule, of which more than 1.8 million hours would be required every 
year in perpetuity. That translates into 3,292 years, or more than 3,000 bank employees 
whose sole job will be complying with this rule. They will be transferred to a role that 
provides no customer service, generates zero revenue and does nothing for the economy.” 
Brush (2011) writes that the government estimates the cost for compliance and capital to banking 
entities covered by the rule could reach $1 billion.  The office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
estimates the cost of capital alone will reach $917 million.   
Many consider these estimates to be low.  Brush continues by quoting Donald N. Lamson who once 
worked for the OCC as assistant director and is now a Washington-based counsel at Shearman & 
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Sterling; “There are a number of costs associated with this and I think the rulemaking and official 
government assessments understate the costs.”   
After withdrawing the revenues generated by the prohibited proprietary trading, the next cost forced 
upon banks will be the cost of compliance with the rule.  Regulators estimate more than six million 
hours will be required in the first year of implementation for documenting, record keeping, and 
reporting (Basar, 2011).  Schorr estimates the cost to the industry for compliance and monitoring will reach $2.1 
billion each year (Mehta, 2011).  When added to the $2 billion in lost revenues, the annual impact of the rule is 
estimated at $4.1 billion – during a weak economy. 
Regulatory agencies suggest using 17 metrics in the process for determining if a bank has engaged in 
market making or in the prohibited practice of proprietary trading (Mehta, 2011, Oct 16).  Davis Polk & 
Wardwell LLP Law Firm (Davis, Polk & Wardwell, 2011) created a series of flowcharts to explain the 
Volcker rule.  The flowchart demonstrating the complexity of the metrics used to determine the 
difference between market making and proprietary trading can be found in Appendix A.   
Mehta (2011) writes in her article about the additional costs that will be incurred by the need to hire 
new compliance employees.  Daily calculations running the 17 metrics will be required of firms with 
more than $5 billion in trading assets and liabilities.  The results are to be reported to regulators 
monthly.  Thirteen firms fall into this category and account for 98.4 percent of the trading assets and 
liabilities of the 1,020 bank holding companies that are to be regulated by the rule.  One compliance 
person will be required in each subsidiary and trading unit to meet the required monitoring for the rule.  
Each bank may have a multiple of a dozen trading units.  To comply with the rule, a multiple of a dozen 
additional jobs in the compliance division would be required. 
Middle sized banks will be required to measure eight of the seventeen metrics, and the small sized 
banks will be exempt.  The smaller scale would make the costs prohibitive for the added monitoring. 
The result of the required monitoring is to add jobs that will add to costs without generating any 
revenue.  The added costs, estimated at $2 billion, will be incurred at a time when banks are striving to 
improve their financial condition during a weak economy. 
Proprietary Trading or Market Making? 
Proprietary trading is done for a financial firm’s own benefit and is prohibited in the proposed rule.  
However, market making, which is the buying or selling of equities or securities for the benefit of 
customers, is allowed.  The impact of the Volcker Rule will not be limited to banking entities.  Investors 
will be impacted with a meaningfully unintended result if the rule is applied too restrictively regarding 
proprietary trading and market making due to its lack of clarity.   
Market making provides liquidity in the markets and increases market efficiency.  The definition of market 
making in the Financial Dictionary by Farlex (2011) provides insight into how difficult it can be to identify the 
difference between proprietary trading and market making.  A market maker is, “a dealer available to trade a 
stated security on its own account at any time at the quoted price. The job of a dealer is to be a market maker in 
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order to promote liquidity for a security. When a broker-dealer makes a market, it trades from its own inventory, 
which is easier and less expensive for an investor than looking for other brokerages willing to trade. Many 
exchanges designate a market maker for each of its listed securities to promote ease of trade.  Market makers 
improve the efficiency of markets by quoting both bid and ask prices of an asset.”   
Thomas Gira, Executive Vice President of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) is quoted 
by Mehta (2011) as saying the Volcker Rule has the “potential to impact legitimate activity.”  FINRA is 
the largest independent regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United States.  It oversees 
nearly 4,495 brokerage firms, 163,450 branch offices, and 635,515 registered securities representatives.  
Some of its purposes range from registering and educating brokerage industry participants, to writing 
rules, to resolving disputes, to informing and educating the public.  FINRA defines itself as an advocate 
for investors that maintains fair markets and, most importantly regarding the Volcker Rule, it proactively 
addresses “emerging regulatory issues before they harm investors or the markets,” (FINRA, 2011).  Gira 
continues by pointing out that what constitutes market making is a “difficult question to get your arms 
around.  From a surveillance standpoint, this is a pretty challenging rule,” (Mehta, 2011).   
Jamie Dimon, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of JPMorgan Chase made a public statement on 
October 13th saying that banning proprietary trading was “fine.”  In the statement made during the 
conference call, Dimon described the importance of banks acting as market makers for investors; “The 
United States has the best, deepest, widest, and the most transparent capital markets in the world, 
which give you, the investor, the ability to buy and sell large amounts at very cheap prices.  That’s a 
good thing.  I wish Paul Volcker understood that.”  (Mehta, 2011).   
David A. Viniar, Chief Financial Officer of Goldman Sachs, and James Gorman, Chief Executive Officer of 
Morgan Stanley, both of whom are in the process of implementing the rule, are shutting down their 
proprietary trading divisions.  They too, are concerned about losing capacity for market making.  They 
warn that if the Volcker Rule is interpreted too strictly, banking entities will see their capacity for market 
making hindered.  The investor will ultimately feel the impact when market liquidity is reduced (Brush, 
Harper, & Moore, 2011). 
Lost Capacity for Banks and Businesses to Compete 
An unintended result of the proposed rule is how it will decrease competitiveness by all that are 
affected by its reach.  To begin with, it will give the advantage to all foreign banks that will not have any 
involvement with U.S. financial services covered by the rule. 
Peter Nerby, a Moody’s Investors Service analyst, observes that, “The rule disadvantages the important 
core market-making franchises of the big U.S. banks and creates opportunities for unregulated 
competitors, such as high-frequency trading firms, and the non-U.S. operations of foreign banks,” 
(Panchuk, 2011).   
While speaking on a panel hosted by New York University’s Stern School of Business in September, the 
chief executive of JPMorgan’s investment bank, James (Jes) Staley commented on the regulators’ 
observance when the Volcker Rule was first introduced.  He said assurances were made that other 
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countries “would fall in line but we haven’t seen that.  Germany, France, China, Brazil.  They didn’t 
follow us.” (Touryalai, Oct 12).   
The rule covers all banking entities that fit the guidelines, whether they are U.S. owned or foreign 
owned.  Landy (2011) summarizes how the rule expands its jurisdiction beyond the U.S. shores.  First, no 
party to a trade may be a U.S. resident, which includes U.S. companies.  Second, no person in the U.S. 
may be directly involved in the trade, including employees of non-American banks that are operating in 
the U.S.  These restrictions will cause jobs to leave the country as foreign owned banks move their 
offices and branches out of the United States. 
The third part of Landy’s summary states that a trade must be “executed wholly” outside of the United 
States.  No part of a trade may be executed by any banking entity, clearinghouse, stock exchange, or any 
other entity that is a part of the U.S. financial system.  The last point of Landy’s summary has to do with 
compliance.  Every trade must be proven to comply through documenting, reporting, internal controls, 
and certifications. 
Not only will jobs leave the U.S., but it can be inferred that given the high costs associated with 
compliance with the Volcker Rule, rather than adding new jobs to enforce the U.S. rule, foreign banks 
may decide to avoid working with U.S. customers.  For example, it would be difficult to grasp how 
European banks could absorb the lost revenues and increased costs during the current financial crisis 
taking place in the European Union.   
The competition in the global markets will shift away from U.S. banking entities and customers.  The 
revenues generated from the transactions may not cover the higher costs, and the U.S. customers – 
including businesses – will have to pay higher fees.  If enforced, the proposed rule will place our banks 
as well as our U.S. companies at a disadvantage while competing in the global markets. 
Prop Traders Exiting Investment Banks 
A result of the proposed Volcker Rule is that proprietary traders are leaving the regulated institutions 
and either going independent or moving to private asset managers or insurance companies, all of which 
are relatively unregulated entities by comparison, to open new hedge funds (Major Trends, 2011).  This 
transfer of risk from a regulated entity to a far less regulated entity does not accomplish the goal of the 
rule.  The new hedge funds are not subject to the regulations to which the covered financial entities 
must adhere.  Instead of investing their wealth in a regulated environment, albeit not perfect regulation, 
investors are placing their wealth at greater risk of loss in an environment that is not subject to the same 
regulations.  
Another destination for exiting prop traders and hedge fund managers is offshore, in particular, Asia.  
With them go their talents and skills in creating wealth, which will be encountered in competition with 
those still working to create wealth in the United States.  The investment opportunities will be lost in the 
U.S., as well as the jobs of those that left and all the support jobs.  Tax revenues generated through 
capital gains taxes are lost for the country, too. 
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What is the difference between a prop trader and hedge fund manager?  While both are experienced 
with managing large amounts of capital, a bank prop trader has a different focus regarding capital and 
risk.  Prop traders do not view capital as a tightly fixed amount (Analysis, 2011). They have an 
investment “credit line” financed through the bank’s balance sheet.  By contrast, private asset managers 
and independent hedge fund managers are not in a division of a larger entity with a larger balance 
sheet.  Their capital is limited to a balance sheet of the assets they manage from day-to-day that is more 
finite than the balance sheet of a banking entity. 
The second difference between prop trading and managing a hedge fund is the amount of cash 
maintained (Analysis).  Again, prop traders can take more risk while working with minimal cash.  Hedge 
fund managers maintain a certain amount of cash in preparation for customer redemptions.  The higher 
percentage of cash balance reduces the amount of risk in the fund. 
The third difference between prop trading and managing a hedge fund is diversification (Analysis).  An 
individual prop trader can specialize in a single type of asset.  Diversification is not a focus for an 
individual prop trader.  It is established through the combination of the trading activities of the many 
prop traders in the banking entity who each specialize their area of asset classes.  In contrast, a hedge 
fund manager is required to provide diversification within the fund.  Diversification within a fund can 
decrease the amount of investible capital that can be used to manage risk while unwinding a position.  
The differences between prop trading and hedge fund management lead to different risk management 
structures.  An example of a broker-dealer that was overwhelmed with too much risk was MF Global 
Holdings Ltd., which would not be covered under the Volcker Rule.   
Carney (2011) describes events that lead to MF Global’s filing for bankruptcy.  After constructing what is 
traditionally viewed as a low risk “repo-to-maturity” trade of European debt with capital owned by the 
firm, the risk suddenly increased as the value of the bonds decreased.  The result was a circle of events.   
Regulators required more capital in preparation for probable margin calls, as well as the disclosure of 
the size of position.  After learning the size of position and the higher risk due to the lower value of the 
bonds, ratings agencies issued downgrades of MF Global’s credit, which in turn led to further creditor 
calls for additional collateral.  Circumstances surrounding MF Global’s demise were not new to the 
financial sector.  Its situation was similar to the crisis experienced by American Insurance Group (AIG) 
during the financial crisis. 
At first, even though MF Global is not covered by the Volcker Rule, its implosion seems to support the 
purpose of the rule in that its demise has not led the entire financial system to the precipice of 
implosion.  However, the important phenomenon of herding has not been considered.  When herding 
occurs, the sum of the parts adds up to a systemically meaningful whole, potentially leading to a 
systemic risk of failure. 
 
Alida Skold 
 
8 
 
HEDGE FUNDS 
Herding 
To effectively manage or regulate systemic risk, it is essential to first understand the two channels 
through which the risk can occur.  King and Maier (2007) provide the following analysis of the two 
channels: 
“A direct channel occurs when a collapse of a hedge fund (or group of hedge funds) 
holding large positions leads to forced liquidations of those positions at fire-sale 
prices.  The impact on asset prices may be amplified through the use of leverage – 
whether created directly through the use of margin or indirectly through the 
embedded leverage of derivative positions. Such a disorderly unwinding, it is feared, 
could generate heavy losses to counterparties and ultimately contribute to severe 
financial distress at one or more systematically important financial institutions. 
 
In the indirect channel, a forced hedge fund liquidation exacerbates market 
volatility and reduces liquidity in key markets. Systemic risk can occur when 
correlations in asset classes increase during times of stress, or when the potential 
for herding amplifies market movements.” 
 
King and Maier (2007) caution that systemic risk increases when economies and markets experience 
increased stress.  The correlation between asset classes increases, and hedge fund trades herd together, 
amplifying market movements.  If enough hedge funds unknowingly herd together with a trade that 
makes sense given market conditions, market volatility increases as does the potential for systemic risk 
with increased price movement.  Tail risk events are occurring more frequently, again increasing the 
potential for systemic risk through herding.  The Volcker Rule does not address the potential for 
systemic risk from the domino effect of hedge funds and broker-dealers. 
The financial system has been actively working to reduce the amount of systemic risk in the system since 
2007.  Tim Ryan, President and Chief Executive Officer of Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association (SIFMA) included the following quote in his opening remarks for the annual SIFMA meeting 
held November 7, 2011: 
 “Since the end of 2007, U.S. financial firms have raised more than $300 
billion of common equity. The largest U.S. banks have reduced their average 
leverage ratio from 16:1 to 11:1 and increased loan loss reserves by about 200%. 
Off-balance sheet activity has also been reduced dramatically. Many have already 
undergone stress tests with both the Treasury and Fed. Over 90 percent of the TARP 
capital infusion funds into banks have already been repaid, with interest, dividend 
and warrant sales for a profit of $19 billion to the taxpayers to date.” 
 “At SIFMA, we have been focused from the very early days of regulatory 
reform on being productive participants in the process. Through our committees, on 
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which almost 6,000 members from the industry participate, we provide information 
and analysis to help the regulators craft rules that work and create certainty. We 
support measures to restore faith and confidence in our financial system, such as 
establishing a systemic risk regulator and the designation of bank and non-bank 
firms as systemically important. We believe there should be a uniform fiduciary 
standard of care. We support risk retention and other improvements in the 
securitization space to help jumpstart recovery of the housing market. But we 
cannot support measures which disrupt market functions or increase systemic risk, 
ultimately failing to achieve what Congress and the Administration sought to 
accomplish with this legislation.” 
Capitalism is fortified by competition and sustainability.  If a business practice does not support the 
company’s sustainability, the company will take action to correct the practice.  The financial system is 
implementing the changed practices as noted in Tim Ryan’s statement to decrease systemic risk, which 
in turn will increase the sustainability of a company and ultimately of the financial system. 
Risk Transferred to the Vulnerable 
 
One of the effects of the Volcker Rule prohibiting banking entities from owning more than three percent 
in a hedge fund or private equity fund is to transfer the risk from the financial sector to an already 
vulnerable segment of the population, the current and future retirees. 
There is a large dislocation in funding of pension funds that is driving the funds to increase investment in 
hedge funds to capture the absolute returns.  In the White Paper, “Major Trends Occurring in 2011: 
Implications for Hedge Funds / Funds of Funds,” Infovest 21 (2011) writes about the increasing demand 
by pensions that are underfunded.  At year-end 2010, Standard & Poor’s estimated the amount of 
combined underfunding to be $315 billion for 1500 of the largest United States pension funds.  In 2010, 
corporate pension funds were funded at average to 81 percent, and state and local funds were funded 
at average to only 79 percent.  Infovest21 further defined the lack of performance in pension funds that 
invested in the S&P 500, which had a return of only 0.4 during the ten years from 2000 to 2010.   
With the Volcker Rule prohibiting prop trading and more than three percent ownership in hedge funds, 
the best and the brightest traders and managers are exiting the banks to manage hedge funds 
independently or within financial entities not covered by the rule.  They will not be met with the 
regulatory concerns arising from the Volcker Rule, including limits on compensation (Major Trends, 
2011).   There are two issues that arise from the relocation of talent.   
The first issue is that many of the skilled and talented prop traders do not have experience with running 
a business.  The business activities that were segregated into separate departments of the bank 
suddenly become a part of the traders’ daily schedule when running a hedge fund outside of the 
banking entity (Major Trends). Higher costs are associated with the administrative duties of a hedge 
fund office.  Commentary from a law firm in the “Major Trends Occurring in 2011” White Paper by 
Infovest21 provides perspective on the different requirements of a hedge fund that is managed outside 
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of a banking entity.  The law firm recommends: 
“that managers adopt articulate FCPA (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977) 
compliance policies and procedures, establish oversight by senior executives with 
responsibility for compliance policy implementation and review, require annual 
certification and regular training, establish procedures for entering into a third party 
business relationship, create a reporting system to ensure that violations can be 
promptly detected and remedied, set up accounting procedures and controls to 
ensure accurate accounting and books and records, and have independent audits 
conducted.” 
The broker-dealer MF Global provides an example of what can happen when accounting books and 
records are not accurate.  Inaccurate accounting methods brought negotiations for a merger with other 
broker-dealers to a halt.  MF Global was rapidly searching for a buyer with a larger balance sheet that 
could absorb the risk; however, each broker-dealer considering the merger stated they backed away 
after analyzing the books.  The statement was made by one broker-dealer that it could not “get a good 
sense of what was on the balance sheet,” (Lucchetti & Patterson, 2011).   
MF Global was forced into filing for bankruptcy.  The events support the statement made by Pirrong, a 
finance professor specializing in risk management at the University of Houston.  Mehta (2011) quotes 
Pirrong; “You think you’re reducing risk but you’re shifting it around in ways that can come back and bite 
you.  Customers will go to other financial entities. (The Volcker Rule) doesn’t make the problems go 
away.  It just changes the location.”  Add herding to the mix, and Pirrong’s statement becomes even 
more concerning. 
At the time of the writing of this paper, $600 million of MF Global’s customer money cannot be found.  
In the article written by Lucchetti and Patterson (2011), a regulator with the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) made a statement regarding the condition of the accounting books ten days out 
from the initial bankruptcy filing.  To date, the numbers are not leading the regulators to the customers’ 
money.     
Prior to the Volcker Rule, the concern over customer money is what has prompted some to construct a 
“fund of one,” (Major Trends, 2011).  In response to the fraud from Madoff, private wealth divisions 
were increasing their due diligence teams and creating new products.  The fund of one was a new 
product in which the fund was constructed with investment from a single customer.  The customer 
might be an individual, a pension fund, or another type of investor.  A feature is that it eliminates the 
opportunity for the Ponzi scheme fraud committed by Madoff.  A fund of one can be cost prohibitive 
with the extra accounting, compliance and administration required, which makes it less attractive to 
hedge fund managers outside of investment banks. 
The second issue concerns the management of risk within the fund.  The prop traders and fund 
managers are talented and skilled in their areas of specialization; however, their risk management skills 
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were sharpened with a balance sheet that could absorb a greater amount of risk.   
MF Global, with its ties to Goldman Sachs talent, is an example of the difference in risk management 
techniques of a more constrained, broker-dealer balance sheet as compared to the larger investment 
bank balance sheet of Goldman Sachs.  The relatively sedate risk management technique that matched 
the smaller balance sheet was ratcheted up by the investment bank talent.  A higher tolerance for risk 
had been learned while working with a much larger balance sheet (Brush, Harper & Moore, 2011).  The 
trade that had been thought to involve low risk suddenly altered into a trade that involved too much risk 
for the smaller balance sheet of the broker-dealer.   
MF Global had to declare bankruptcy; however, Goldman Sachs would have had the capacity to manage 
the risk through additional hedging while unwinding the position, leaving the fund intact.  The events of 
MF Global’s demise point to the transfer of risk from investment banks to other venues that can be 
more vulnerable.  Smaller banking entities with smaller balance sheets and retirees are more susceptible 
to risk.  The Oregon public pension fund was invested in a fund that had been built to $7 billion and then 
used to invest in MF Global.  The fund is down 60 percent (Erman, 2011).   
When pension funds could invest in funds managed by banks, they had the additional assurance of the 
bank performing due diligence to decrease the likelihood of fraud.  With the prohibition in the Volcker 
Rule, pension funds along with all other investors in hedge funds, will have to rely solely on their 
independent due diligence while researching the fund manager’s competency and legitimacy.  With the 
trading strategies that are unique to hedge funds, the funds are not readily transparent, causing both 
competency and legitimacy to be difficult to determine. 
Conclusion 
Rather than remove the capability of banks to continue competing in their areas of expertise, the 
financial system could be strengthened rather than pieced apart by placing stricter limits on the amount 
of risk taken and the amount of leverage used.  The lack of clarity between prop trading and market 
making could be resolved through the use of tier one capital.  Ultimately, the investor is benefitted 
through a more competitive investment environment that will maintain market liquidity. 
Jobs will leave the U.S. if the current proposed rule is enforced. The increase in required bureaucracy 
and the high costs associated with compliance with the Volcker Rule may cause foreign banks to end 
conducting business within the U.S. and to avoid working with U.S. customers.  Either the revenues 
generated from the transactions will not cover the costs and the associated bureaucracy, or the U.S. 
customer will pay substantially higher costs for the financial service.  If enforced, the proposed rule will 
place our banks as well as our U.S. companies at a disadvantage while competing in the global markets. 
The intention of the proposed Volcker Rule is to reduce risk of lost investor capital and to reduce 
systemic risk in the financial system.  Further transformation of the rule is needed to reach the intended 
results.   
If the Volcker Rule is enforced, further effects of the rule will be to decrease revenue and to markedly 
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increase costs of compliance for banks at a time when the entities are recovering from the recent 
financial crisis, and when economic growth has been slow. 
In its current form, the proposed rule lacks clarity between prohibited proprietary trading and allowed 
market making activities.  As covered banking entities end prop trading, they may also decrease market 
making out of lack of clear definition.  The result will be less liquidity in the markets, causing less 
efficiency and increasing costs for investors.   
Rather than prohibit prop trading, banks should be regulated to limit prop trading to tier one capital.  
Two objectives would be met with implementation of this type of regulation.  Customer deposits would 
be protected from prop trading activities, and banks would not be concerned about how the regulatory 
agencies would interpret their market making activities.  Market liquidity would not be negatively 
impacted by regulation. 
Investment by banking entities, covered by the proposed Volcker Rule, in hedge funds and private 
equity funds is limited to 3%.  Risk is transferring from regulated banking entities to less regulated asset 
managers and insurance companies as prop traders exit investment banks to open new hedge funds, 
and banking entities are exiting their prohibited ownership or relationships with the funds.   
Pension funds that are underfunded are increasingly searching for absolute returns generated by hedge 
funds and returns from private equity funds.  The unintended result of reducing systemic risk in banking 
entities will be the transfer of risk to relatively unregulated financial asset management entities and the 
vulnerable current and future retirees. 
In divergence from the proposed Volcker Rule, rather than severely limit regulated banking entity 
ownership or relationships with hedge funds and private equity funds, systemic risk can be reduced by 
lowering the amount of leverage allowed to generate the absolute return.  The future and current 
retirees depending on pension funds will benefit from the increased competition between banking 
entities within an investment environment that is regulated. 
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Appendix A 
 
Davis Polk & Wardwell Law Firm, LLP.  (2011, Oct 12).  Volcker Rule Proposed Regulations: Proprietary Trading. 
Retrieved from http://www.volckerrule.com/proprietary/prop.htm. Link: 2a. Market Making vs. Proprietary 
Trading. 
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